three leading candidates opting out, the general opinion among political professionals has been that no serious candidate in the future can afford to accept public funding unless the system is changed. Indeed, by the end of the 2004 primary season, there were clear rumblings-particularly from the Kerry campaign-that the general election system was also in trouble. Despite the system's flaws, however, it is clear that without some kind of public funding system, Sen. Kerry would have faced no serious competition at all after Howard Dean lost the Iowa caucuses. None of the other challengers would have been competitive without matching funds, just as Kerry himself could not have challenged Dean without public funding if he were not wealthy. With the system's viability so clearly at risk, it is important to consider what this might mean for future elections.
INTERSECTING RULES
Recent problems with the presidential funding system trace back to a simple historical fact: the public funding system came into being at a time when the modern presidential primary system was also new. Since then, the primary system has changed markedly, but there has been no corresponding change either in the way the public funding system supports candidates or in the unrealistic restraints it tries to put on their spending.
The first presidential primaries were held in 1904, but what made the primaries the dominant mode of selection were the delegate selection reforms the Democratic Party put into effect for 1972. In 1968, 38 percent of the Democratic Party's convention delegates and 34 percent of the Republican delegates were from states that held primaries. By 1972, the percentages had gone up to 61 percent for the Democrats and 53 percent for the Republican. In 1976, 73 percent of the Democratic and 68 percent of the Republican delegates came from primary states (Wayne, 2000:12) .
The first election under the new delegate selection rules, 1972, coincidentally was also the election during which burglars hired by the Committee for the Reelection of the President (CRP) broke into the Watergate offices of the Democratic National Committee. Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency under pressure in 1974 after the White House's attempt to cover up CRP's role came unraveled. CRP's fundraising practices also led to the Federal Election Campaign Act amendments of 1974 (FECA) . The 1974 law contained important new disclosure requirements and contribution limits, but the most innovative sections probably were the presidential public funding provisions. For the general election, the law provided a flat grant of $20 million to major party candidates (with a proportional formula for minor parties), adjusted every four years for inflation. In 2004, the adjusted amount came to $75 million. In return, candidates who accepted public funds for the general election had to agree not to spend more than the flat grant.
For the primaries, the 1974 law created a mixed private-public system combined with a spending limit for participating candidates. The system provides $1 erage could not be counted on to fill in the gap. The topics covered by the news would be out of the candidate's control and would probably focus on ''horse race'' stories or the day's latest allegation rather than the candidates' policies or qualifications. For a candidate to get his own message across, advertising was essential. And while the Internet may hold promise for disseminating messages cheaply in the future, expensive television advertising was still the vehicle of choice for reaching large numbers of people quickly.
These calendar-driven realities led directly to the pressures that caused three candidates to reject public funding in 2004. For the thirty years since the public funding system came into being, successful participating candidates have typically spent almost the full spending limit by the time they wrapped up the nomination, whenever that was. Spending up to the limit is not new, but frontloading the calendars means that spending becomes frontloaded too. The successful and runner-up candidates of 1996 and 2000 had spent almost up to the limit for the full election cycle by March (Campaign Finance Institute Task Force on Financing Presidential Nominations 2003) .
Given the accelerated spending and the difficulties of raising new money quickly, the candidates of 2004 were well advised, if they could, to have enough money by the end of December to carry them well into February (Mayer and Busch 2003) . Indeed, the conventional wisdom among journalists was that the candidate with the most money at the end of the odd-numbered year would win. The conventional wisdom was overstated, of course: Bill Bradley did not lose to Al Gore in 2000 because he had slightly less money. Both candidates had enough, and the race was decided on other grounds. But the general idea was right. Candidates have to raise a lot of money early to make it through this timetable. Typical estimates bandied about in early 2003 suggested that a strong underdog would raise at least $15 million in the off year, while the front-runner probably would raise at least $25 million. To translate these numbers into daily activities, a person who raises $15 million in one calendar year must raise an average of $41,000 a day for 365 days; to raise $25 million in a year means raising $68,000 a day. With this amount of money needed so early, the primary calendar helps stack the race in favor of front-runners with well-oiled fundraising capabilities.
The pressure to spend early means that candidates who survive the early contests will run up against the spending limit later in the season. Candidates who are not the front-running favorites of large donors typically need help from public funding. To get public money, they agree to a spending limit. The system is voluntary, but the money and the limits are linked. That is not a major problem as long as everyone abides by the same limit, but lately that has not been so. In 1996, billionaire Steve Forbes became the first serious presidential challenger to announce he would step outside the public funding system to finance his own campaign. He spent $42.6 million, mostly his own money, in a year when the spending ceiling was $37.7 million. Bob Dole beat Forbes but spent the full limit to do so. When the incumbent President Clinton launched negative advertising against Dole in the spring, the GOP winner could not respond. In 2000, George W. Bush, knowing Forbes would be running again, referred specifically to 1996 when he announced that he would not take public funding. ''I'm mindful of what happened in 1996 and I'm not going to let it happen to me,'' Bush said (Glover 1999). Bush's principal opponent, John McCain, did take public funds. Without them, he never would have made it as far as he did. McCain dropped out of the race after losing seven of the eleven Super Tuesday primaries. (He won four of the five New England states and lost California, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, New York, and Ohio.) But McCain would have found it almost impossible to continue even if he had done better. To reach Super Tuesday, he had spent up to his limit, and he would have had to run in the coming month against someone who did not face the same constraint. The spending limit that drove Bush out of the system in the beginning thus became a trap for his opponent at the end.
Once Bush and Vice President Gore had effectively won their nominations in March 2000, each could turn his attention to the general election. With no spending limit, Bush could conceivably have emulated the 1996 Clinton by running advertising at a time when Gore, having reached his limit, was out of money. But between 1996 and 2000, the parties had perfected using ''soft money'' for candidate-specific ''issue advertising'' that did not count against the party contribution limits or the candidate's spending limit. By spending about $15 million in soft money during the ''bridge period'' between Super Tuesday and the convention, the Democratic National Committee was able to keep proGore advertising on the air. Soft money was, in effect, the party's safety net for the bridge period in 2000. But that safety net would not be available in 2004 because the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) had outlawed national party soft money. The concern about being trapped by Bush thus helped fuel Dean's and Kerry's decisions to reject public funding in 2004, just as a similar fear about being trapped had influenced Bush four years before.
THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN 2004: ''IT'S ALL ABOUT BUSH''
For almost all of the other political players in 2004, President's Bush's demonstrated fundraising prowess dominated the campaign finance picture. Democratic candidates had to measure their campaigns against the knowledge that if they got through the primaries, they would be up against Bush for five months before they would get public funds for the general election. The Democratic National Committee shared the same fear, as did the most significant donors to the new, liberal 527 organizations.
Networks and Goals
The President's performance in 2000 had given all of these players good reason to worry. Since 1976, no candidate before 2000 had raised substantially more than the spending limit. Bush raised more than double the limit. Beginning with fundraising networks from his father's presidential campaigns and his own as Governor of Texas (Green and Bigelow 2002), Bush had $96 million in net receipts in 2000, shattering all previous records. At the heart of this success were the ''Pioneers''-people who agreed to solicit and raise at least $100,000 to elect Bush as President. Five hundred fifty people signed up to become Pioneers, 241 of whom were identified by the campaign as having reached the $100,000 goal (Texans for Public Justice 2004). These 241 people alone accounted for a minimum of $24.1 million. (They undoubtedly raised more, but the campaign did not publicly identify how much money each raised.) According to John C. Green and Nathan S. Bigelow, the success was based on ''accountability and competition'': Each Pioneer has his or her own personal account code with the Bush campaign, so that each person could get credit for the money he or she raised. The Bush campaign carefully monitored the incoming contributions, bestowing praise and status to the Pioneers who met the $100,000 pledge. This system of monitoring and rewards created strong incentives among the Pioneers that tapped into the competitive drive of business executives, lawyers, and politicians (Green and Bigelow 2002) .
But the Pioneers were far from the whole story. The Bush campaign had 60,116 donors who gave the legal maximum of $1,000, most of whom gave that amount in a single check. This money from $1,000 donors-more than double Gore's take from all individual donors in whatever amount-represented 65 percent of Bush's contributions from individuals. The sheer size of the donor list also meant that more than half of Bush's $1,000 contributions probably came from outside the Pioneer network.
No one expected Bush's 2004 fundraising to stop there. After BCRA raised the contribution limits from $1,000 to $2,000, estimates of Bush's 2004 fundraising capabilities immediately skyrocketed. If Bush could convert most of his $1,000 donors into $2,000 donors, the reasoning went, he would start with a fundraising base of $120 million in addition to the $35 million he raised from other donors in 2000. As an incumbent President running without primary opponents, and no spending limit, the President clearly was in a position to raise more than he had in 2000. The minimum estimate, therefore, was that the President would raise at least $150 million. The campaign itself talked about $175 million and then $200 million. These goals frightened potential opponents but turned out to be modest.
Fast Start
Because of the war with Iraq, which began in March 2003, the Bush-Cheney '04 Committee did not file organizational papers with the Federal Election Commission until May 16. Beginning with an initial cash transfer of $671,000 left over from 2000, the campaign did not hold its first fundraising event until midJune. In a remarkable two weeks between June 17 and June 30, the President appeared at seven fundraising events (in Washington, DC, California, New York City, and Florida) that raised $16.45 million; Vice President Dick Cheney appeared at four events, raising $2.8 million; and First Lady Laura Bush appeared at two, raising an additional $1.3 million (Public Citizen 2003) . By June 30, the committee reported more than $35 million in receipts, about $1 million a day since it began fundraising! The next reporting period began as the previous one ended, with President Bush attending fundraising events in Dallas on July 18 and Houston on July 19 that pulled in $7 million between them. In the quarter from July 1 through September 30, Bush-Cheney '04 raised $50.1 million, followed by fourth quarter fundraising of $47.5 million. By the end of 2003, the Bush campaign committee had raised $132.7 million, compared to $139.6 million raised during 2003 by the ten Democratic challengers combined. That averaged more than $600,000 a day since the committee had registered with the FEC on May 16. To put this amount of fundraising in perspective, it is the equivalent of more than a dozen $2,000 contributions every hour for twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. After spending $33.6 million in 2003, President Bush began 2004 with $99.1 million cash on hand.
One reason for this fundraising success was the same networking idea that proved so successful four years before. But there were new wrinkles this time. Instead of having only a single recognition level for Pioneers who raised at least $100,000, the campaign added $200,000 Rangers, as well as a group of about ninety-five Mavericks, who were fundraisers under 40 years old who brought in at least $50,000. ( 
Turnover among Donors
The campaign had an even higher turnover among donors than among fundraisers. Based on past survey research and on interviews with fundraising professionals, we at the Campaign Finance Institute had expected to find when we analyzed campaign donor records that most people who gave money to President Bush in 2000 would do so again in 2004. This did not happen. There was more turnover among donors than we had been led to expect, not only for Bush but for all candidates. In fact, the numbers are so striking that it would be valuable to do further research to see why the results are so inconsistent with past findings that described donors to federal elections as a small and relatively static pool of repeat contributors. For example, 50 percent of all congressional donors and 46 percent of presidential donors have said in recent surveys that they contribute in most elections (Brown, Powell and Wilcox 1995; Francia et al. 2003; Wilcox et al. 2003 
Large and Small Donors
While President Bush, like John Kerry, eventually raised unprecedented amounts in unitemized contributions below $200-a subject to which we shall return later-the bulk of the President's itemized contributions came from people who gave the highest permissible amount. The number of people who gave the maximum $2,000 to the President in 2004 was slightly higher than the number who gave the then-maximum $1,000 in 2000 (61,229 versus 61,116) . These $2,000 donors represent 41 percent of the total number of itemized donors (donors who gave more than $200) in 2004. The number of donors who gave $1,000 or more in 2004 (including the $2,000 donors) numbered 89,697, or 60 percent of the itemized donors.
As a percentage of money, the role of the $2,000 donor was even more impressive. 
Bush Sets the Context/
These were the numbers that Democrats were seeing during the closing months of 2003, when they had to decide whether they would accept at most $15-$18 million in matching funds in return for committing themselves to a $50 million spending limit. Because the government normally distributes its checks shortly after the first of the year, candidates have to decide by December, at the latest, whether they wish to participate. Candidates who had no serious prospect of raising $50 million had an easy choice: take the public funds and do not worry about a spending limit that was beyond reach. But for candidates who might reach that level-Howard Dean and John Kerry-President Bush was setting the framework within which they would choose.
THE DEMOCRATS' MONEY PRIMARY: THE INSIDERS SEEK BIG DONORS
In February 2003, the Atlanta Journal and Constitution wrote a financial ''horse race'' story about the Democratic presidential candidates whose framework reflected the thoughts of many political professionals:
The first race in the 2004 Democratic presidential campaign is for cash. . . . In every campaign since 1980, the candidate who raised the most money by the start of the election year went on to win the nomination. So the cash primary, lasting from now [early 2003 ] until the first voting in Iowa and New Hampshire next January, is a race to raise as much money as possible (Shepard 2003a Kerry's status as the press's putative front-runner did not last long. The Massachusetts Senator raised $7 million in the first quarter of 2003. That was a big number, but the bragging rights went to John Edwards, who raised $7.4 million. More than half of Edwards's first quarter money came from his fellow trial lawyers (Edsall and Cohen 2003) . But like Kerry's so-called lead at the beginning of the year, Edwards's financial lead did last (see table 11 .2).
After fast starts, both Edwards's and Kerry's fundraising fell off markedly while Lieberman's went up and down, and Gephardt's stayed steady. Like many of their predecessors in past elections, these four ''insider'' candidates were depending on large contributions from a small number of donors. By the year's end, many of the party's loyal donors were waiting to see which candidate would have the political strength to move forward. Meanwhile, the ''outsider'' candidates, Wesley Clark and especially Howard Dean, were causing some to begin questioning their old fundraising assumptions.
LARGE AND SMALL DONOR FUNDRAISING
The dependence of the four insider candidates on major donors was not new. One of the original goals of the public matching fund system was to heighten the importance of small donors. Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter did raise much of their money in small contributions. But the system had almost relentlessly been steering candidates toward major donors at least since 1988 or 1992 (Cam- About 100,000 gave to more than one candidate, so that CFI found about 834,000 donor-candidate pairings-combining all contributions from the same donor to the same candidate into one record. Of these 834,000:
• An estimated 569,000 donors gave in amounts that cumulated to $100 or less to any one candidate (averaging an estimated $52 per contributor).
• Another estimated 101,000 donors gave $101 to $250.
• Some 52,245 donors gave $251 to $999.
• Some 112,365 donors gave $1,000.
Thus, about 68 percent of the donors gave $100 or less and 13 percent of the donors gave $1,000 (CFI 2003:105) But most of the money came from the small group of top-dollar donors. The four candidates responsible for most of the fundraising in 2000 raised more than 60 percent of their money from $1,000 donors (Gore 63 percent, Bradley 66 percent, Bush 72 percent, and McCain 45 percent) (CFI 2003:31) .
Fundraising is driven toward large contributions because of some simple facts. It takes twenty $50 contributions to equal one $1,000 contribution without matching funds. For a publicly funded candidate with a one-for-one match on the first $250, it still takes 12.5 $50 contributions ($50 becomes $100 with a onefor-one match) to equal one $1,000 contribution (which was worth $1,250 after a match). BCRA doubled the contribution limit but did nothing to change the public founding formula. Under the new system, therefore, a $50 contribution, matched, is still worth $100, but a maximum contribution-now $2,000-is worth $2,250, or 22.5 times as much as the small donor's $50.
In the first stages of a campaign, candidates often must ask for large contributions personally. But when you divide the number of minutes per day into the amount of money its takes for a candidate to run a presidential campaign, there is no way to raise enough solely through personal contacts. The candidate needs a ''force multiplier.'' Democratic candidates have traditionally relied on organized interest groups to help them reach out, but candidates of both parties also raise much of their money for the primaries by relying on politically active intermediaries who host events for them in major fundraising centers (New York, Los Angeles, and Washington for both parties, along with Dallas and Houston for Republicans). George W. Bush's major innovation, as noted, was to take networking to new levels in 2000 and 2004 with his Rangers and Pioneers. The question is whether there are any feasible alternatives to high-donor networking for presidential candidates who have to run in expensive, frontloaded primaries.
One alternative might be to reach out to small donors, but the arithmetic in past years has been problematic. People who give $50 do not part with their money any more easily (maybe even less so) than people who give $1,000. Donors respond to appeals; they are more likely to accept those appeals if they know something about the person who is asking for money. For small donors, however, the appeals must be made even more indirectly than it is within donor networks. The more distant or indirect the appeal, the more broadly will the candidate have to be known among the general public for the appeal to draw a response. This is why most appeals to small donors presuppose a campaign that has already caught fire or a candidate who is well-known before the campaign or a well-known endorser. Small donor appeals cannot be the first step: the question is whether they can be the basis for the steps that come next.
Before now, the modern presidential candidates who have been most successful at raising money in small amounts have been Ronald Reagan, Jesse Jackson, Pat Robertson, Pat Buchanan, and Gary Bauer. All were able to make distinctive appeals. Most of the appeals were issue-based or ideological. In almost all cases, the initial ''prospecting'' appeals to small donors had to be made by using direct mail, although repeat donors could be reached over the telephone. The kicker is that with direct mail, it could easily cost $1 to raise $1 from new donors. Matching funds would double the yield, but this would still leave the cost at 50 cents to raise a dollar. The process could become more profitable after repeat solicitations to previous supporters yield higher rates of return, but that would come later in the game, after some success. Prospecting for low-dollar contributions, therefore, is a high-risk, low-benefit investment for most candidates, especially during the early phases of a campaign season. Because fundraising for large contributions costs much less per dollar raised, a candidate has to find even more small donors than the original arithmetic suggests to equal the net value of a large one. Instead of taking forty $50 contributions to equal one $2,000 contribution (or 22.5 of the smaller contributions if the candidate takes matching funds), it could take at least half again as many of the $50 contributions to equal the larger one's net value, after fundraising costs have been deducted.
In the fundraising logic that prevailed through 2000, less than one-quarter of one percent of the population gave any money to a presidential candidate. Even though most donors had midrange incomes and gave less than $100, there were fewer than 800,000 donors for the entire 2000 presidential election, and the candidates' funding was dominated by only 112,000 mostly well-to-do people who gave $1,000 each. The funding balance would be shifted radically if even one percent of the voting-age population were to contribute to presidential candidates during the primaries. But it is hard to see how candidates would ever have the resources or the incentive to make this happen, as long as the costs and benefits of raising small versus large contributions remained as they were.
HOWARD DEAN TESTS THE LOGIC
A CFI task force report on presidential funding recommended an increase in the benefits from small contributions. The report recommended changing the match- Because his candidacy had to function within the system as it was, he could not alter the benefits. In fact, Dean eventually went so far as to reduce the financial benefits that he would get from each small contribution when he decided not to accept matching funds. He was able to do this by radically altering the cost side of the equation-scrapping direct mail and raising his money through the Internet. Instead of spending a dollar for every dollar raised, the Internet holds out the possibility of spending less than a nickel. In 2000, Senator John McCain had already shown other politicians that a candidate could raise a lot of money quickly over the Internet, when he raised $2 million that way in the four days after winning the New Hampshire Republican presidential primary. The McCain campaign reportedly raised a total $6.4 million over the Internet in all (Cornfield 2004). However, according to people we interviewed from McCain's campaign staff, many of his Internet donors after New Hampshire were repeat donors who were solicited over the telephone and then steered to the campaign's website to make a contribution. The question the Dean campaign set out to answer in 2004 was whether Internet participation could become a more significant part of a campaign's basic strategy. Without support from major donors, the Dean campaign had no other choice.
Howard Dean began his outsider's long-shot campaign for the presidency by traveling often, on a low budget, to the early primary and caucus states. The issues he emphasized early in his campaign made it hard to pinpoint him along a left-to-right scale: he was for balancing the budget, against new gun control laws, and against the unfunded mandates in President Bush's education program; but he was also for strong environmental regulation, civil unions for gay couples and universal health insurance.
The Dean campaign then received a major boost from a shift in the national policy agenda. On September 4, 2002, President Bush announced that he would seek congressional approval to use force against Iraq. On October 10, the House Soon, the intensity of feeling about the war began translating into financial support. Dean's $2.6 million in receipts during the first quarter of 2003 put him fifth among Democrats but was surprisingly close to Lieberman's $3 million and Gephardt's $3.5 million. The support tapped into what reporter Thomas B. Edsall described as ''the new Democratic elite: affluent, well-educated professionals.'' The top zip codes in donors' addresses were from Beverly Hills, Pacific Palisades, and Palo Alto in California and Cambridge, Massachusetts. While some of these zip codes may not be unusual for a Democratic candidate, the occupational profile was: Dean had many more professors, writers, and artists as donors than did the other Democrats and fewer chief executive officers (Edsall 2003a) .
Only about $600,000 of Dean's first quarter's totals came over the Internet, with about two-thirds of that coming during the quarter's last week (Trippi 2004) . There was a story behind that $400,000. By early 2003, Joe Trippi had signed on as Dean's campaign manager. Trippi was a veteran political consultant who also had acted as a consultant for the past several years for several technology firms, including Wave System and Progeny, a Linux platform company. ''On my very first day in the Dean campaign headquarters, that January,'' Trippi wrote later, ''I offered up the closest thing I had to a strategy: 'We need to put up a link to this Web site, Meetup.com''' (Trippi 2004). Meetup.com is a website that helps arrange meetings in public places among like-minded people on selfdefined subjects, ranging from food tastes to Wicca. After an initial test quickly garnered 2,700 Dean supporters, the campaign paid Meetup.com a fee of $2,500 to continue organizing-''not a bad initial investment for a site that would even- The core of all major-donor fundraising is the same as low-donor fundraising, and low-donor fundraising online, which is that it is about relationships. . . . In a relationship you don't come and ask for money every day. . . . If I come to you every day and say, here's what's going on, come join me at this event, here's how I feel today, here's what's happened, and then on the tenth day I say I really need five bucks to get to the train station, you're a lot more likely to do that. . . . The other part of that personal relationship is the relationship that happens between peoplethere's the central one-to-many relationship [with the candidate at the center] and there's also the many-to-many relationships (Campaign Finance Institute, 2004b).
The $400,000 the Dean campaign raised over the Internet in the last week of March was stimulated by just such a peer-to-peer communication. Someone in the network, not organized at the top by the campaign, sent a message that others distributed through emails and blogs (Trippi 2004) . It was an early indication of what was to follow.
The success during March led the campaign to redouble its Internet efforts during the second quarter. This built toward a late-June crescendo, when Gov. Dean formally ''announced'' his candidacy. According to Trippi, the campaign had raised $3.2 million during the quarter, as of June 22, when Dean appeared on the Sunday morning television interview show, Meet the Press. Over the next week, the campaign raised an additional $2.8 million, $2 million of which came over the Internet. The campaign was using the picture of a baseball bat on its home page, with a rising line to track incoming contributions. Feeding into the sense of momentum, 317,639 participants voted in an online ''primary'' conducted by the liberal MoveOn.org, which issued a press release on June 27 saying that Dean had come in first with 44 percent of the votes (MoveOn.org 2003) . Two days before the end of the reporting period, Trippi upped the fundraising goal from $4.5 million to $6.5 million and made the goal public. By midnight, June 30, the supporters had raised $7.6 million during the quarter, $828,000 of which came in during the last twenty-four hours. (Trippi 2004 Once Dean announced his decision, two other candidates said they would consider following him. One was retired General Wesley Clark. Clark was a late entrant into the race, announcing his candidacy on September 17. His brief run, which had the backing of many of former President Clinton's supporters, had some earmarks of a ''Stop Dean'' campaign. Many Democrats who desperately wanted to defeat President Bush were afraid that Dean could not do it. With the other Democratic campaigns apparently not doing well, many began to look at Clark. The Clark campaign was run in a highly professional manner, with an Internet operation described by some computer sophisticates as second only to Dean's. The $10.3 million that Clark raised in the fourth quarter of 2003 (following $3.4 million during September) was the third strongest fundraising quarter for any Democrat that year, behind only Dean's third and fourth quarter receipts. Despite the strong showing, Clark decided he could not afford to turn his back on public funds.
The other candidate affected by Dean's announcement was John Kerry. Kerry had already told reporters in September, ''If Howard Dean decides to go live outside of it, I'm not going to wait an instant. . . . I'm not going to disarm'' (Kranish 2003). On November 13, five days after Dean, Kerry announced that he would follow the Vermonter out of the system. The decision had all the same advantages that it had for Dean, with one important addition. Accepting public funds not only forces a candidate to live within spending limits but prohibits him from giving or lending more than $50,000 to his own campaign. On December 18, Kerry lent his campaign $850,000 and said he would mortgage his house to lend the campaign more. By the end of December, he had lent the campaign $2.9 million; another $3.5 million followed in January. The loans kept the campaign afloat at a time when his other fundraising had hit a dry hole. Opting out of the system therefore let Kerry remain active in the campaign long enough to become the acceptable alternative to Dean among Democrats in Iowa and New Hampshire.
SPEND-DOWN TIME: IOWA AND NEW HAMPSHIRE THROUGH SUPER TUESDAY
By year's end, the candidates seemed ready to spend whatever money they had in order to win early. By then, most were cash poor and thoroughly dependent on the infusion of public money they were to receive early in January. The major exception was Kerry, who by the end of January was to lend his campaign about twice the amount he would have received from the Treasury. Because of the primary schedule, the candidates in 2004 spent more money, more quickly than ever. At a February CFI event, the University of Wisconsin's Kenneth Goldstein estimated that the candidates spent $11.5 million to purchase airtime in Iowa and another $14 million for New Hampshire. Overall in the early states, Goldstein said that Dean spent $11 million, Clark $10.5 million, Kerry $8.5 million, Edwards $6.5 million, Gephardt $5 million, and Lieberman $4.5 million. (Campaign Finance Institute 2004b) On other occasions, Goldstein has also said that the methodology by which these estimates were produced probably underestimates the real cost. For all of the candidates except Dean, advertising through the New Hampshire primary cost a substantial portion of the previous full year's receipts. In addition to the candidates' spending, at least two organizations ran attack ads criticizing Dean: the conservative Club for Growth and a 527 committee created for the occasion called Americans for Jobs, Healthcare and Progressive Values. Because the latter committee stopped advertising more than thirty days before the caucuses, when BCRA's electioneering provision would have kicked in, the 527 did not have to disclose its supporters until after the primary. Some of its organizers had previously worked for Dick Gerhardt, but the Gephardt campaign said that it had no involvement with the organization.
As is well known, the Dean campaign collapsed on January 19 in Iowa, where he finished a distant third with only 18 percent support from the caucus participants. Gephardt finished fourth with 11 percent and dropped out of the race. With Clark and Lieberman passing up Iowa to concentrate on New Hampshire, voters who were looking for an alternative to Dean shifted to Kerry (who won Iowa with 38 percent) and Edwards (who came in a strong second with 32 percent). Both had been far behind Dean in public opinion polls in the weeks leading up to the caucuses.
Kerry had also been behind Dean in New Hampshire polls but defeated him in that state's January 27 primary with 39 percent of the vote to Dean's 26 percent. Clark came in third (13 percent) with Edwards a close fourth (12 percent) and Lieberman fifth (9 percent). Seven states held primaries a week after New Hampshire, on February 3. Kerry won five convincingly (Arizona, Delaware, Missouri, New Mexico, and North Dakota). Clark defeated Edwards by less than a percentage point in Oklahoma: each received 30 percent of the vote to Kerry's 27 percent. Edwards won South Carolina with 45 percent to Kerry's 30 percent. Lieberman withdrew from the contest after failing to place higher than fourth anywhere.
By the time this round of primaries was over, most of the candidates had spent almost all they had raised. The public funds distributed in early January accounted for almost three-fifths of Edwards's spending during the month. It seems obvious that without that money, he would not have been in a position to come in second in Iowa. Public funds also accounted for 85 percent of Gephardt's January spending and 90 percent of Lieberman's. The following table shows the top candidates' cumulative spending, cash on hand, and debts as of January 31.
By early February, political realities were affecting fundraising. Gephardt and Lieberman were out of the race. Edwards and Kerry had been given a modest boost by the February 3 results. The next week, Edwards came in second to Kerry in Tennessee (41 percent to 26 percent) and Virginia, (52 percent to 27 percent) with Clark finishing a close third in Tennessee (23 percent) and a distant third in Virginia (9 percent). Clark withdrew from the race on February 11.
Meanwhile, the Dean campaign was struggling politically, shifting campaign managers the day after losing the New Hampshire primary. Nevertheless, after coming in second to Kerry in Michigan (Feb. 7), Washington (Feb. 7), and Maine (Feb. 8), Dean was able to persuade his base of small donors to come through for a last stand in the Wisconsin primary on February 17. After finishing third, with only 18 percent of the vote to Kerry's 40 percent and Edwards's 34 percent, Dean dropped out of the race on February 18.
After Kerry won three more primaries on February 24 (Hawaii, Idaho, and Utah), the March 2 Super Tuesday primaries were decisive. By this time the race was down to two serious candidates (Kerry and Edwards) and two who had never been competitive (Kucinich, who did come in second in Hawaii, and the Rev. Al Sharpton). Kerry won nine of the ten primaries held on Super Tuesday. Edwards won none. The narrowest margin was in Georgia, where Kerry beat Edwards, 47 percent to 41 percent. The next smallest was in Ohio, where Kerry had three votes for every two votes for Edwards. In seven states (California, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, and Rhode Island), Kerry outpolled Edwards by at least two to one. Dean won his home state of Vermont. Edwards withdrew from the race the next day, March 3.
An important point about the financial implications of frontloading emerges when comparing January's spending (table 11.4) to February's (table 11.5). February's spending had to pay for that month's seven primaries (excluding the seven held February 3, some of the spending for which was reported in January). The February reports also covered most of the campaigning in the ten Super Tuesday states. Despite the number of states (twenty-four) holding primaries or caucuses between February 3 and March 2, the total amount spent by the leading candidates in January and February was roughly the same. In addition, we know that most of the candidates' activities and advertising in the final quarter of 2003 focused on Iowa and New Hampshire. Clearly, the spending per voter was much lower in the later (and larger) states. Indeed, the candidates spent less in all states during the month than a competitive Senate candidate typically would spend during the final month of a campaign in only one of the larger states.
It is also worth noting the contributions to candidates during February. Because Edwards withdrew on March 3, the February financial reports mark the end of the contested phase of the process. Kerry's $7.9 million in contributions from individuals during February was by far his best fundraising month during the campaign to date. We stress this point because the amount, which seemed large at the time, was about to look smaller.
By the end of February, Kerry had spent a cumulative total of $39.1 million. This was about $10 million more than Edwards, but $10 million less than Dean, and less than the spending ceiling if Kerry had taken matching funds. The candidates who came in second and third in the fundraising race-one in the matching fund system and the other not-came in first and second among the voters. The campaign was about to enter a new phase.
SUPER TUESDAY THROUGH CONVENTIONS
On March 4, two days after Super Tuesday, Bush-Cheney '04 began airing television advertisements. The first ads praised the President's leadership. Within days, the campaign was criticizing Sen. Kerry's record. During the month of March alone, the Bush-Cheney campaign spent $49.6 million-as much as the full twoyear spending limit for a publicly funded candidate, doubling the amount it had spent during the entire campaign cycle until then. An estimated $40 million of this went for television advertising.
Sen. Kerry spent ''only'' $14.5 million in March. That was much more than his campaign had spent in January ($7 million) or February ($9 million) but was not up to the incumbent's level. However, Kerry was helped by other Democratic candidates and by independent groups. In the months before Super Tuesday, all the Democrats took on the President in most of their advertising. In a March 25 press release, Ken Goldstein's Wisconsin Advertising Project described the cumulative Bush and Democratic candidates' advertising as being nearly equal Kerry's financial shortage did not last long. From the Democratic Unity fundraising dinner of March 25 until the convention in late-July, the presumed nominee raised money at a pace that no other candidate, except Bush, had ever matched. The Kerry campaign learned from others, imitating their successes. For major contributors, Kerry learned from Bush. His 266 Vice-Chairs (responsible for raising $100,000 each) and 298 Cochairs ($50,000 each) were successfully patterned after the President's 221 Rangers ($200,000) By the time the year was over, the Kerry campaign had $235 million in net receipts, all but $41 million of it after Super Tuesday. The campaign was so successful financially that those running it ''exhaustively debated'' whether to reject public funding for the general election (Edsall and VandeHei 2004; Rutenberg and Justice 2004b) . The issue came up because the campaign strategists were concerned about the sequencing of the two conventions. With the Republican convention more than a month after the Democrats convention, Kerry would have to make his decision about public funds before he could be sure what Bush would decide. Some feared President Bush might reject public money after Kerry had taken it. If that happened, Kerry would have been trapped by the spending limit while Bush would be free of it. In the end, Kerry did take the grant. In future years, however, other candidates will surely consider the option again.
Bush-Cheney '04 raised a net total of $270 million, but the campaign moved at a different pace from the challenger's. By spring, the campaign stopped holding major fundraising events, steering major donors toward contributing to the party instead. In the six months from March through August, the campaign raised $102 million, which was a significant amount, but less than half of Kerry's total over the same period. Small donor fundraising did pick up over these months, with Bush's $51 million slightly below Kerry's $57 million. For the full election cycle, Bush raised $78 million in small contributions to Kerry's $79 mil-lion. However, Bush relied less than Kerry on Internet fundraising. While the Bush campaign claimed more volunteers recruited online (1.2 million to Kerry's 750,000) and a larger email list (6 million to 2.5 million), its online fundraising brought in only $13 million (Samuel 2004) . Most of the remaining $65 million in small contributions apparently came through the mail.
At the end of the process, the two candidates had raised nearly a half billion dollars, almost evenly divided between them. As skimpy as the resources were for Democrats during the competitive weeks of January and February-when the candidates had to worry whether they could afford to buy advertising-these two winners had more than enough to be heard. Whatever else would decide this election, neither of these general election candidates would suffer from a lack of money.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
George W. Bush and John Kerry did well for themselves by opting out of the public matching fund system. In contrast, at least four of the 2004 candidatesJohn Edwards, Wesley Clark, Richard Gephardt, and Joseph Liebermandepended on public funds to keep their campaigns viable long enough for the voters make their decisions in Iowa and New Hampshire. One of them, Edwards, did well enough in the primaries to be asked to run for the Vice Presidency on Kerry's ticket. This made Edwards only the most recent example in a twentyeight-year series.
The following list shows a few of the significant underdog candidates since 1976-including three future presidents-who were just about out of money, running against well-funded opponents, when an infusion of public funds made it possible for their campaigns to remain viable. Hart (1984) had about $2,200 at the end of December 1983, $2,500 in January 1984, and $3,700 at the end of February. Walter Mondale had $2.1 million in cash on January 31, 1984-more than 800 times as much as his opponent.
• Jesse Jackson (1988) was down to $5,700 at the end of 1987 at a time when the front-runner, Michael Dukakis, had $2.1 million.
• Paul Tsongas (1992) had $80,000 in cash on January 31, compared to Bill Clinton's $1.4 million.
• Pat Buchanan (1992) had $12,000 in cash on January 31 compared to the incumbent President Bush's $8.9 million.
• John McCain (2000) was comparatively the richest of these underdogs, with $350,000 in cash on January 31, 2000. His opponent, George W. Bush, had $20.5 million in cash on the same day, spent down from $31 million the previous month.
In each of these cases, the ''money primary'' without a matching fund system would have settled the race in favor of the front-runner before the official balloting had even begun. In light of 2004, we need to ask what the situations of similar candidates are likely to be in future elections. Underdogs could have a hard time even getting their campaigns started. Imagine how a potential early donor might react if a strong, front-running candidate were to signal an intention to break through the spending limit. The donor might prefer one of the other candidates on the merits. Nevertheless, the donor would have to think twice in that situation before giving: why contribute if you know the spending limit will make it impossible for the candidate to compete in the decisive primaries? To attract early money in the current system, therefore, a candidate probably will have to be willing to reject matching money. Someone who might be a good president need not apply unless he or she can compete in the unlimited money race. Public funds would still be useful for propping up candidates who have no chance to win, but the value to the public would become marginal.
Over the past thirty years only four kinds of candidates have been able to mount viable campaigns without public money:
• Rich candidates who were willing to invest personal funds (Ross Perot, Steve While these were all worthy candidates, the financial characteristics that let them run without public funds clearly do not capture the full range of potentially good presidents who might deserve the public's attention. The three presidents on the historical list above put the lie to that claim. If others are to have a chance to run as serious candidates in the future, the system needs to change. At a mini-mum, the spending limit has to permit candidates to campaign realistically against an opponent who is running with no limit.
The CFI Task Force (mentioned previously) recommended a two-pronged approach to resolving this problem. The first was to raise the spending limit for the nomination the same as it is for the general election (about $75 million in 2004). The second was to make sure candidates had an escape hatch: if they take public money and have to run against someone who rejects it, participating candidates should be able to raise as much money as ones who opt out. 4 The CFI Task Force also recommended that candidates be able to receive public funding early in the year before the election instead of waiting until January of the election year. This would serve two purposes. First, it would make public money available when it is most needed, as campaigns are getting started. Second, it would alter the incentives for candidates who are deciding whether to accept public funds. It would be hard to imagine, for example, that Howard Dean would have rejected public money in April or June of 2003 before he knew that his Internet fundraising would take off, if this set of incentives had been in place.
Two questions arise. First, can candidate run adequate races on $75 million? They can, as long as everyone plays by the same rules. Seventy-five million dollars was a lot more than John Kerry or Howard Dean spent during the contested phase of the nomination contest in 2004-through Super Tuesday-and more than George W. Bush spent through this stage in 2000. Most of the additional money was spent between Super Tuesday and the convention, after the nomination was effectively settled. After Super Tuesday, or whenever the real race is decided, the parties are in a position to pick up the slack for the candidates. If both parties' candidates live by the spending limit, the Supreme Court and Federal Election Commission have made it clear that a party can make unlimited independent expenditures. But if one party's candidate stays in and accepts public funding and the other's does not, independent spending for the participating candidates would not be as efficient as the opponent's direct spending. In that situation the CFI Task Force recommended that the party whose candidate stayed in the system be allowed unlimited coordinated spending.
These spending limit proposals, or some others like them, could help to preserve public funding for candidates. By themselves, however, they would not restore one of the system's original and still viable purposes: enhancing the role of small donors. The data showed that except for Dean's supporters, participation by small donors in 2004 was almost entirely a post-Super Tuesday phenomenon. To stimulate greater participation by small donors during the competitive phase of the primary season, the CFI Task Force recommended changing the matching fund from the current one-for-one match for the first $250 to a threefor-one public match on the first $100 in private donations (indexed). 5 This change may not seem major but because an overwhelming majority of donors still give candidates less than $100 each, this apparently small change could make small donors financially as important collectively as the major donors who now Finally, to control costs in a situation where the ''escape hatch'' creates at least a potential for unlimited spending, the CFI Task Force said that no candidate should need more than $20 million (indexed) in public funds to sustain a viable campaign. To pay for its proposals, the CFI Task Force recommended increasing the income tax checkoff from the currently static $3 ($6 for joint filers) to an indexed $5 ($10 for joint filers.) This would be more than enough to pay the estimated $115 million cost of the Task Force's recommendations. 6 These specific recommendations may be questioned. However, there can be little doubt that the current public matching fund system is obsolete. A viable system will need an appropriate mix of incentives, addressing both matching funds and spending limits in light of current campaign practices. Without change, we can expect the system to become largely irrelevant. That would be a real loss for the presidency and for the public. 2. Of course, to put this in perspective, one should note that all of the Democratic contestants combined raised less money during the second quarter of 2003 than President Bush's campaign did during the month of June alone.
3. The author served on the Task Force and drafted its two reports, from which the remainder of this essay is derived. The full reports, with accompanying evidence, may be found at www.Campaign- 4. Two major alternatives to the CFI package have been put forward as of this writing. The differences are to some extent over matters of detail. Federal Election Commissioners Scott Thomas and Michael Toner offered recommendations that were not specific as to the spending limit but presented a range that went as high as $250 million (Thomas and Toner 2005) . A more complex proposal introduced by Senators McCain and Feingold along with Representatives Shays and Meehan on November 21, 2003, (shortly after the first CFI Task Force report) would also have increased the limit to $75 million if everyone participated, with a ceiling of $150 million if someone opts out (S. 1913 and H.R. 3617, 108th Congress) . The CFI Task Force argued (contrary to commissioners Toner and Thomas) that $75 million is more than adequate if all candidates participate in the system. But it also argued, contrary to the McCain-Feingold bill, that a candidate who opts out would have an incentive to blow through any limit, whatever it might be, if it were fixed. Since a fixed limit could
